Computational Integrity with a Public Random String from Quasi-Linear PCPs

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Joint work with Eli Ben-Sasson, Iddo Ben-Tov, Alessandro Chiesa, Ariel Gabizon, Daniel Genkin, Matan Hamilis, Evgenya Pergament, Mark Silberstein, Eran Tromer and Madars Virza

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Motivation

Definition (Computational-integrity¹(CI))

The language of triples (M, \mathbb{X}, T) such that: Nondeterministic machine M accepts \mathbb{X} , within at most T steps (T is binary).

Goal: Practical CI system implementation (POC) **Take home message:** Practical solutions without trusted-setup are achievable

¹This problem also known as *checking* [BFLS91],*certifying* [Mic00],*delegating* [GKR08],and *verifying* [GGP10] (computations).





Our result

Today I will tell you about SCI:

- "Scalable Computational Integrity"
- First implementation² of a theoretical construction that achieves all of the below:
 - Publicly verifiable
 - No trusted-setup
 - Universal
 - Succinct verification



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²Proof-of-concept in C++



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Other approaches

- Designated-verifier/trusted-setup systems [IKO07, GGPR13, PGHR13, BCG⁺13, BCG⁺14, CFH⁺15, ...]
 - ©Tiny proofs (hundreds of bytes)
 - ©Very efficient verification (milliseconds)
 - ©Designated-verifier...
 - ©...or require a trusted-setup

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- Non-universal systems [GKR08, RRR16, ...]
 - ©No cryptographic assumptions
 - ©Restricted class of programs
- Non-succinct systems [Gro11, GMO16, ...]³
 - ©Efficient prover
 - ©Verification time ~ program execution time

³Succinct communication-complexity in [Gro11]

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 Uses classical approach (PCP) [BM88, GMR89, BFL91, BGKW88, FLS99, BFLS91, AS98, ALM⁺92, Kil92, Mic00, ...]

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- With recent asymptotic improvements [BGH⁺05, BS08, BCS16]
- And concrete (non-asymptotic) constructions [BCGT13, CA15]

Cryptographic assumption

- Inner protocol (IOP[BCS16, RRR16]⁴):
 - Provably sound⁵.

⁴also known as PCIP in [RRR16]

Summary

Cryptographic assumption

- Inner protocol (IOP[BCS16, RRR16]⁴):
 - Provably sound⁵.
- Compilation to argument system:
 - Using the random oracle model.
 - Non-interactive using Fiat-Shamir heuristic.

⁵Implementation uses security conjectures to improve concrete efficiency. (ロト イラト モントモン・モン・モン・モン・シュー つへで 10/25

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Cryptographic assumption

- Inner protocol (IOP[BCS16, RRR16]⁴):
 - Provably sound⁵.
- Compilation to argument system:
 - Using the random oracle model.
 - Non-interactive using Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
- Implementation:
 - Treating the hash-function as a random-oracle.

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⁴also known as PCIP in [RRR16]

Protocol overview (based on [Kil92])

1. Prover constructs a proof for the CI claim

- Proof is too big to be sent to verifier
- Only Merkle commitment is passed to verifier
- Interaction with verifier used to reduce load on prover
 - Formalized in [BCGRS17], to be presented in ICALP 2017
- Time complexity $\tilde{O}(T)$
- 2. Verifier draws polylog(T) random queries to proof, sends them to prover
- 3. Prover answers queries
 - Merkle paths added for integrity with commitment
- 4. Verifier decides whether to accept
 - False-rejection impossible
 - False-acceptance with probability $< 2^{-80}$

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Low-degree testing definition (informal)



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Low-degree testing definition (informal)

I wonder if this polynomial is of degree $< 2^n$. Too bad my time complexity is only poly (n) ©





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Low-degree testing definition (informal)

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Of course it is low degree!







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Low-degree testing definition (informal)



Low-degree testing definition (informal)



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Low-degree testing

- Low-degree testing is common in classical CI solutions
- SCI is the first system implementing succinct low-degree testing
 - Based on [BS08]
- In contrast: Trusted-setup systems use public-key cryptography that enforces low-degree polynomials
 - Using homomorphic encryption



The [BS08] test:

Prover algorithm:

- Given a candidate f : F → F
 claimed to be of degree d
- The prover constructs $Q: \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \to \mathbb{F} \text{ s.t.}$

$$\deg_x(Q), \deg_y(Q) < \sqrt{d} \iff \deg(f) < d$$



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- Repeated recursively for Q's restrictions to rows and columns
 - Until degree small enough
 - Resulting in a proofs-tree



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Verifier algorithm:

Verifier tests a small random fraction of leafs and consistency over their paths to the root



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- Observation: most subproofs never accessed by verifier
- In the PCP model, queries are not known in advance, thus prover must construct the entire proofs-tree
 - Results in proof size $\Omega(2^n \cdot n)$
- Problem: too expensive for practical implementations



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Low-degree testing — SCI solution

- SCI solves the problem by interaction
- The verifier guides the prover to construct subproofs only if accessed
- In our construction prover learns a subproof is accessed only after it's path to root is unchangeable
 - Soundness preserved
 - Proof length reduced to $O(2^n)$
- Formal method description in [BCGRS17] (ICALP)



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Benchmark — Subset Sum

- Cl claim: "no nonempty subset of a sums to 0"
 - co-NP hard problem
- Two implementations in TinyRAM⁶:
 - Exhaustive:Θ(2ⁿ)-time, no RAM
 - Sorting: $\Theta(2^{n/2})$ time and space
 - RAM usage increases proof by ×2log(exec-length) = O(n)



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⁶Turing-complete assembly.

Machine specifications: Prover: CPU: 4 X AMD Opteron(tm) Processor 6328 (32 cores total, 3.2GHz), RAM: 512GB Verifier: CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4600 2.1GHz, RAM: 12GB, Circuit: runtime simulated for long inputs Security: Security level: 80 bits (Probability of cheating < 2-80) rover overhead (multiplicative Prover time Proof size - Exhaustive 12h Sorter 1TB Sorter 65 3h 256GE 1.5 1h 64GB 10min 16GE 0.5 4GE Array length Array length Array length **Conclusions:** Prover asymptotic behaviour as predicted; Proving is $\sim \times 10^9$ slower than program execution Query complexity Verification speedup (multiplicative) Verification time 400m - Exhaustive - Sorted Sorted 10 300m 10-3 4MR 200ms 10^{-3} 100ms 1MR 10 Array length Array length Array length **Conclusions:** Verifier asymptotic behaviour as predicted; Succinct only for very long program executions

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Comparison to other approaches

Machine specifications:

CPU: 4 X ÅMD Opteron(tm) Processor 6328 (32 cores total, 3.2GHz), RAM: 512GB Benchmark:

Executing subset-sum solver for 64K TinyRAM steps (9 elements - exhaustive algorithm).



Highlights: competitive prover; Verification succinct but slow; Communication succinct but high

⁷Extrapolated from [Gro11, Table 2]

- SCI our system.
- KOE[BCG⁺13] zkSNARK based on Knowledge Of Exponent hardness.
 Non-succinct setup required.
- IVC[BCTV14] Incrementally Verifiable Computation based on KOE. Setup required (succinct).
- DLP[Gro11] Publicly-verifiable succinct CC but non-succinct verification. Based on hardness of DLOG⁷.

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Highlights: Fastest prover; Verification ~ fastest so far: Communication greatly improved

⁷Extrapolated from [Gro11, Table 2]

SCI - our system.

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- IVC[BCTV14] Incrementally Verifiable Computation based on KOE. Setup required (succinct).
- DLP[Gro11] Publicly-verifiable succinct CC but non-succinct verification. Based on hardness of $DIOG^7$
- Follow-up (in-progress) [BBHR17]
 - Same approach as SCI
 - Guaranties privacy (ZK)
 - Introduces new theory
 - Prover overhead ~ $\times 10^6$

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Practical succinctness in-reach

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Research supported by:



Programmers:

- Ohad Barta
- Lior Greenblatt
- Shaul Kfir
- Gil Timnat
- Arnon Yogev

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Measurements:



SCI Introduction: \bigvee Prover $M(\mathbb{X}, \mathbb{W}) \vdash^{<T} accept$ Verifier

Measurements:



Questions?

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