

Concurrently Composable Security With Shielded Super-polynomial Simulators

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
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
The UC Framework

A Short Introduction

- Security framework for cryptographic protocols (by [Can01])
- Follows the **simulation-based paradigm**
- Interactive distinguisher \mathcal{Z} (“environment”)



Real



Ideal

The UC Framework

Pros and Cons

Benefits

UC is closed under general protocol **composition**:

- strong concurrent security guarantees
- modular analysis

Limitations


(e. g. [CF01; Can+02; Lin03; Kat07; LPV09; Dac+13])

Very strong: UC **requires setup assumptions** for many cryptographic tasks


Relaxed Notions of UC Security

A Brief Overview

SPS [Pas03]




Angel-based [PS04; CLP10]




Relaxed Notions of UC Security

A Brief Overview

SPS [Pas03]



Angel-based [PS04; CLP10]



Multiple-Ideal Query Security and Input Indistinguishability

Not considered here.

See, e. g., [GJO10; Gar+12; GJ13; GGJ13; CGJ15].

Relaxed Notions of UC Security

Pros and Cons

SPS

[Pas03; BS05; LPV09; LPV12; Gar+12]

- + Meaningful security notion for many cryptographic tasks
- + Constant-round general MPC in the plain model based on standard poly-time assumptions
- Not closed under general composition

Angel-based Security

[PS04; MMY06; CLP10; LP12; KMO14; Kiy14; Goy+15; HV16]

- + Closed under general composition (wrt. pre-chosen Angel)
- + Implies SPS security
- + General MPC in the plain model
- No known construction of general MPC protocol that is **both** constant-round and based on standard poly-time assumptions

New Security Notion for Concurrently Composable Security

- Lies **strictly** between SPS and Angel-based Security
- Compatible with UC security
- Closed under general protocol composition
 - Implies concurrent security
 - Modular composition via protocols with “strong composition features”

Our Contribution

Commitment Scheme with Strong Composition Features

Construction of a **commitment scheme** that is

- secure in our framework in the plain model
- provides strong composition features:
 1. Can be plugged into large class of UC-secure protocols
 2. Composite protocol is secure in our framework

Two **constant-round** instantiations:

- based on OWPs
- **black-box** based on homomorphic commitment schemes

Our Contribution

Constant-round (Black-Box) General MPC in the Plain Model

Feasibility result: **General MPC** in the **plain model**

- in a **constant** number of rounds
- based on standard **poly-time** assumptions

Two constructions:

- non-black-box based on ETDPs
 - Conceptually very different alternative to [Gar+12; LPV12]
- **black-box** based on PKE with oblivious public-key generation and homomorphic commitment schemes
 - **First one**

Our Contribution

Constant-round (Black-Box) General MPC in the Plain Model

Feasibility result

- in a **compositional** setting
 - based on **standard poly-time assumptions**
- First one** that is

 - concurrently secure in the plain model
 - black-box
 - constant-round
 - based on standard poly-time assumptions


Two constructions

- non-black-box based on PKE with oblivious public-key generation and homomorphic commitment schemes
 - Conceptually very different alternative to [Gar+12; LPV12]
- **black-box** based on PKE with oblivious public-key generation and homomorphic commitment schemes
 - **First one**

Our Contribution




New Blueprint: Building on Weaker Primitives


Constructions based only on **parallel CCA**-secure commitment schemes
(instead of CCA-secure commitment schemes)




Our Approach

Shielding Away Super-Poly Resources








Composition Theorem

Augmented environments imply **composition** with protocols that may be in the $\mathcal{F}^\mathcal{O}$ -**hybrid model**.

$$\pi \underset{\mathcal{F}^\mathcal{O}}{\geq} \mathcal{F}^\mathcal{O} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \rho^\pi \underset{\mathcal{F}^\mathcal{O}}{\geq} \rho^{\mathcal{F}^\mathcal{O}}$$


Composition with protocol ρ

Polynomial Simulatability

Making $\mathcal{F}^{\mathcal{O}}$ -augmented environments efficient


Main Technique

Replacing super-polynomial entities by polynomial ones

→ Making $\mathcal{F}^{\mathcal{O}}$ -augmented environments efficient


Intuition

Shielded Oracles “look like poly” from the outside.



Polynomial Simulatability


Making $\mathcal{F}^{\mathcal{O}}$ -augmented environments efficient



Augmented environment

Polynomial Simulatability

Making \mathcal{F}^O -augmented environments efficient



Standard poly-time UC environment

Goal

Construct a protocol Π such that

$$\Pi \underset{\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}^{\mathcal{O}}}{\geq} \mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}^{\mathcal{O}}$$


for a suitable \mathcal{O} .

Necessary Prerequisites for Π

- Hiding can be broken with super-poly powers (**extractability**)
- Binding can be broken with super-poly powers (**equivocality**)

Secure Commitment Scheme

The Big Picture




Secure Commitment Scheme


Building Block – Tag-based Commitment Scheme $\langle C, R \rangle$

- **Immediately Committing**

→ super-poly extractable



- **Parallel-CCA secure**



Secure Commitment Scheme

The Scheme Π

Extractability (in super-poly time)

... follows from the extractability of $\langle C, R \rangle$.

Equivocality (in super-poly time)

... using the transformation of [DS13]:


Receiver of Π commits to **equivocation trapdoor** at the beginning.

Secure Commitment Scheme

Definition of the Shielded Oracle \mathcal{O}

Corrupted Sender

\mathcal{O} plays role of honest receiver




Secure Commitment Scheme

Definition of the Shielded Oracle \mathcal{O}

Corrupted Receiver

\mathcal{O} plays role of sender



Secure Commitment Scheme

Security Statement

Theorem

If $\langle C, R \rangle$ is **immediately committing** and **parallel-CCA-secure**, then


$$\Pi \underset{\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}^{\mathcal{O}}}{\geq} \mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}^{\mathcal{O}}$$

Secure Commitment Scheme

Proof Idea – Discrepancy

Let the **sender** be corrupted.


- Environment commits to value v but unveils **different** value w
 - Output of receiver in **real model**: w
 - Output of receiver in **ideal model**: v (value extracted by \mathcal{O})
- Environment can distinguish




Secure Commitment Scheme

Proof Idea – A Possible Attack Strategy

Challenge Protocol
with corrupted sender



Need some form of
non-malleability
to prevent attack



Secure Commitment Scheme

Proof Idea

To show

\mathcal{Z} cannot cause a discrepancy (except with negligible probability)

Proof by contradiction

Assume $\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}^{\mathcal{O}}$ -augmented environment can cause a discrepancy:


- Make environment efficient
(interacting with only one $\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}^{\mathcal{O}}$ -session with a corrupted sender)
- Proof that no efficient environment can cause a discrepancy

Secure Commitment Scheme

Making the Environment Efficient

“Carefully” replace $\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}^{\mathcal{O}}$ -sessions with the real protocol Π in a specific order

→ Non-uniform reduction to parallel-CCA-security of $\langle C, R \rangle$




This talk is too short to contain the proof.

Modular Composition Theorem for Π

Composing with constant-round UC-secure protocols

If $\langle C, R \rangle$ has additional property (“*r*-non-adaptively robust”)

as well as



then

$$\rho^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}} \underset{\text{UC}}{\geq} \mathcal{G} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \exists \text{ shielded oracle } \mathcal{O}' : \rho^{\Pi} \underset{\mathcal{G}'}{\geq} \mathcal{G}^{\mathcal{O}'}$$

Modular Composition Theorem for Π

Composing with constant-round UC-secure protocols

If $\langle C, R \rangle$ has additive

as well as

$\rho^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}}$ constant-round

and

$\rho^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}}$

=

Commit Phase

Compute Phase

then

$$\rho^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}} \underset{\text{UC}}{\geq} \mathcal{G}$$

\Rightarrow

$$\exists \text{ shielded oracle } \mathcal{O}' : \rho^{\Pi} \underset{\mathcal{G}^{\mathcal{O}'}}{\geq} \mathcal{G}^{\mathcal{O}'}$$

Any (poly-round) protocol can be **compiled** into one obeying this structure


Secure Commitment Scheme

Constant-round Instantiations of Π

$\langle C, R \rangle$ can be instantiated with a modified version of the 8-round protocol in [Goy+14] ...

- ... using OWPs
 - Constant-round protocol based on OWPs.
- ... using a verifiable perfectly binding homomorphic commitment scheme
 - Constant-round **black-box** protocol

*Blum commitment
or
verifiable perfectly binding
homomorphic commitment*



Modular Composition Theorem for Π

Constant-round Instantiations of Π

Constant-round Instantiations of Π

- Π_r = instantiation of Π based on OWPs
- Π_r^{BB} = **black-box** instantiation of Π based on verifiable perfectly binding homomorphic commitment schemes

(Instantiated with a r -non-adaptively robust modified version of [Goy+14])

Constant-round (Black-box) General MPC

UC-secure
Protocol

Secure in Our Framework
(in the Plain Model)

$$\rho^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}} + \Pi_r \Rightarrow \rho^{\Pi_r}$$

[Can+02; IPS08]

Constant-round, based on
ETDPs

Constant-round, based on
ETDPs

Constant-round (Black-box) General MPC

UC-secure
Protocol

Secure in Our Framework
(in the Plain Model)

$$\rho^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}} + \Pi_r \implies \rho^{\Pi_r}$$

[Can+02; IPS08]

Constant-round, based on
ETDPs

Constant-round, based on
ETDPs

$$\rho^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}} + \Pi_r^{\text{BB}} \implies \rho^{\Pi_r^{\text{BB}}}$$

[HV15]

Constant-round, **black-box**,
based on PKE with oblivious
public-key generation


Constant-round, **black-box**,
based on cryptographic
primitives with polynomial
hardness

The End

Take Away Messages

- New universally composable security framework
- Secure commitment scheme with modular composition property
- Constant-round black-box general MPC based on standard assumptions
- All results based only on parallel-CCA-secure commitments

Thank You



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
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Appendix

Constant-round Commitment Scheme

The Scheme II (Reminiscent of [DS13])


Commit Phase



Constant-round Commitment Scheme

The Scheme II

Unveil Phase



Constant-round Commitment Scheme


The Scheme II

Equivocation Trapdoor Index set I serves as trapdoor

Compute “fake shares”:

$$t_{i,l_i} := s_{i,l_i}, i \in [n]$$


$$t_{i,-l_i} := s_{i,-l_i} \oplus 1, i \in [n]$$



Constant-round Commitment Scheme

Definition of the Shielded Oracle \mathcal{O}


Corrupted Sender



Constant-round Commitment Scheme

Definition of the Shielded Oracle \mathcal{O}

Corrupted Receiver




Constant-round Commitment Scheme

Proof Idea – Discrepancy

Let the sender be corrupted.

Commit Phase




Constant-round Commitment Scheme

Proof Idea – Discrepancy

Let the sender be corrupted.


Unveil Phase



Constant-round Commitment Scheme

Proof Idea


- W. l. o. g.: Consider at most one $\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}^{\mathcal{O}}$ with a **corrupted sender**
- Iteratively replace all $\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}^{\mathcal{O}}$ with a **corrupted receiver** by Π , starting with the **last** session



Constant-round Commitment Scheme

Proof Idea

Non-uniform reduction to parallel-CCA security of $\langle C, R \rangle$




Next Goal

- Want to plug Π into UC-secure protocols
- Composite protocol secure in our framework
 - Allows to **re-use existing UC results**

Modular Composition Theorem for Π

Commit-Compute Protocols



Any (poly-round) protocol can be **compiled** into one obeying this structure
(using randomized commitments)

Modular Composition Theorem for Π

The Theorem

Let $\rho^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}}$ be a commit-compute protocol and Π as before.

$$\rho^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}} \underset{\mathcal{E}\text{-pCCA}}{\geq} \mathcal{G} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \exists \text{ shielded oracle } \mathcal{O}' : \rho^{\Pi} \underset{\mathcal{G}^{\mathcal{O}'}}{\geq} \mathcal{G}^{\mathcal{O}'}$$

UC-environment has
non-adaptive access to
the decommitment oracle
 \mathcal{E} of $\langle C, R \rangle$



This talk is too
short to contain the
proof.

Modular Composition Theorem for Π

Composing with any constant-round UC-secure protocol

Given any constant-round $\rho^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}} \geq_{\text{UC}} \mathcal{G}$.

- Compile $\rho^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}}$
- Additionally require $\langle C, R \rangle$ to be *r*-non-adaptively robust
(for sufficiently large *r*)

