Computation of a 768-bit prime field discrete logarithm

C. Diem, T. Kleinjung, A. K. Lenstra, C. Priplata, C. Stahlke

EPF Lausanne (Switzerland), Universität Leipzig (Germany)





Paris, 1st April 1776



Paris, 1st April 1776



Marie-Sophie Germain

Germain primes q, p = 2q + 1

Paris, 1st April 1776



Marie-Sophie Germain

Germain primes q, p = 2q + 1

Example: $q = [2^{765}\pi] + 31380$, $p = [2^{766}\pi] + 62762$

Two centuries later

Diffie-Hellman key exchange

- Public data: prime p and generator g of \mathbf{F}_{p}^{\times} Alice chooses private random a and computes $A = g^{a}$.
 - 2 Bob chooses private random b and computes $B = g^b$.
 - 3 Alice sends A to Bob; Bob sends B to Alice.
 - 4 Alice computes common secret $S = g^{ab}$ as $S = B^a$.
 - **(5)** Bob computes common secret $S = g^{ab}$ as $S = A^b$.

Two centuries later

Diffie-Hellman key exchange

Public data: prime p and generator g of \mathbf{F}_{p}^{\times} Alice chooses private random a and computes $A = g^{a}$.

- Bob chooses private random b and computes $H = g^{b}$.
- Alice sends A to Bob; Bob sends B to Alice.
- 4 Alice computes common secret $S = g^{ab}$ as $S = B^a$.
- **(5)** Bob computes common secret $S = g^{ab}$ as $S = A^b$.

Discrete logarithm problem (DLP)

Given a prime p, a generator g of \mathbf{F}_p^{\times} and a target $h \in \mathbf{F}_p^{\times}$ find an integer x (denoted by $\log_g h$) such that $g^{\times} = h$.

Two centuries later

Diffie-Hellman key exchange

Public data: prime p and generator g of \mathbf{F}_{p}^{\times} Alice chooses private random a and computes $A = g^{a}$.

- 2 Bob chooses private random b and computes $B = g^b$.
- Alice sends A to Bob; Bob sends B to Alice.
- 4 Alice computes common secret $S = g^{ab}$ as $S = B^a$.
- **(5)** Bob computes common secret $S = g^{ab}$ as $S = A^b$.

Discrete logarithm problem (DLP)

Given a prime p, a generator g of \mathbf{F}_p^{\times} and a target $h \in \mathbf{F}_p^{\times}$ find an integer x (denoted by $\log_g h$) such that $g^{\times} = h$.

Investigate how secure this is for, say, 768-bit prime fields:

Our challenge

Solve the DLP for $p = [2^{766}\pi] + 62762$, g = 11, $h = [2^{766}e]$, i.e., find x such that

 $11^x \equiv h \pmod{p}.$

Number field sieve (NFS):

- Polynomial selection: Find two polynomials f₁, f₂ ∈ Z[x] with a common zero m modulo N (and some conditions). Denote by F₁, F₂ the corresponding homogeneous polynomials.
- Sieving: Choose L and find sufficiently many pairs a, b ∈ Z (relations) such that F₁(a, b) and F₂(a, b) factor into primes ≤ L.
- Matrix step: Construct a matrix from these relations. Solve this system of linear equations modulo 2.

Each solution gives rise to a congruence $c^2 \equiv d^2 \pmod{N}$, and gcd(c+d, N) is a proper divisor of N with probability $\geq \frac{1}{2}$.

Number field sieve (NFS):

- Polynomial selection: Find two polynomials f₁, f₂ ∈ Z[x] with a common zero m modulo p (and some conditions). Denote by F₁, F₂ the corresponding homogeneous polynomials.
- Sieving: Choose L and find sufficiently many pairs a, b ∈ Z (relations) such that F₁(a, b) and F₂(a, b) factor into primes ≤ L.
- Matrix step: Construct a matrix from these relations.
 Solve this system of linear equations modulo q.

The solution vector of the matrix step gives (virtual) logarithms of (some of) the prime ideals $\leq L$ modulo q. Using these logarithms $g^x \equiv h \pmod{p}$ can be solved via *descent* (later). Fundamental difference:

For each integer there is just one factoring problem, whereas for each prime there are many DPLs.

DLP instances with the same prime p share the three main NFS steps. Applicable to cryptosystems in which the same prime p is used by all parties (as is often featured in some standards). Fundamental difference:

For each integer there is just one factoring problem, whereas for each prime there are many DPLs.

DLP instances with the same prime p share the three main NFS steps. Applicable to cryptosystems in which the same prime p is used by all parties (as is often featured in some standards).

Differences between factoring-NFS and DLP-NFS:

- One has more freedom in polynomial selection for DLP-NFS (Joux-Lercier method).
- The matrix step modulo q is about log₂ q times more complex than modulo 2.
- There are some other, minor differences.

RSA-768 timings:

Main steps	time	wall clock time	memory	comments
Pol. selection	40 years	5 months	< 10 MB	low priority
Sieving	1500 years	2 years	1-2 GB	very parallel
Matrix step (193M×193M)	75 years	4 months	200 GB	only 8 tasks

RSA-768 timings:

Main steps	time	wall clock time	memory	comments
Pol. selection	40 years	5 months	< 10 MB	low priority
Sieving	1500 years	2 years	1-2 GB	very parallel
Matrix step (193M×193M)	75 years	4 months	200 GB	only 8 tasks

Naive extrapolation to 768-bit DLP:

Main steps	time	
Pol. selection	40 years	-
Sieving	1500 years	
Matrix step	50000 years	(about 767 times 75 years)

Problem: How can the effort for the matrix step be reduced?

Problem: How can the effort for the matrix step be reduced? Solution: By adapting parameters one looks for better (but rarer) relations, which are supposed to produce a smaller matrix. (smaller factor bases, only two large primes per polynomial) Problem: How can the effort for the matrix step be reduced? Solution: By adapting parameters one looks for better (but rarer) relations, which are supposed to produce a smaller matrix. (smaller factor bases, only two large primes per polynomial)

Consequences:

- The sieving time increases.
- The time for the matrix step decreases (smaller matrix).

Problem: How can the effort for the matrix step be reduced? Solution: By adapting parameters one looks for better (but rarer) relations, which are supposed to produce a smaller matrix.

(smaller factor bases, only two large primes per polynomial)

Consequences:

- The sieving time increases.
- The time for the matrix step decreases (smaller matrix).
- An unexpected side-effect occurred:

One can apply tricks to speed up sieving (halving the running time).

Problem: How can the effort for the matrix step be reduced?

Solution: By adapting parameters one looks for better (but rarer) relations, which are supposed to produce a smaller matrix.

(smaller factor bases, only two large primes per polynomial)

Consequences:

- The sieving time increases.
- The time for the matrix step decreases (smaller matrix).
- An unexpected side-effect occurred: One can apply tricks to speed up sieving (halving the running time).

Unrelated to the above,

one can (and we did) use the Joux-Lercier polynomial selection method. It reduces the complexity of sieving and of the matrix step.

Early 2015 Experiments with 512-bit and 640-bit DLPs Polynomial selection for 768-bit DLP

Early 2015Experiments with 512-bit and 640-bit DLPs
Polynomial selection for 768-bit DLPMay 2015Sieving started for 768-bit DLP

Early 2015	Experiments with 512-bit and 640-bit DLPs
	Polynomial selection for 768-bit DLP
May 2015	Sieving started for 768-bit DLP
August 2015	First matrix built (about 80 million, far too big)

Early 2015	Experiments with 512-bit and 640-bit DLPs
	Polynomial selection for 768-bit DLP
May 2015	Sieving started for 768-bit DLP
August 2015	First matrix built (about 80 million, far too big)
November 2015	Feasible matrix (about 34 million)

Early 2015 Experiments with 512-bit and 640-bit DLPs Polynomial selection for 768-bit DLP
May 2015 Sieving started for 768-bit DLP
August 2015 First matrix built (about 80 million, far too big)
November 2015 Feasible matrix (about 34 million)
December 2015 End of sieving, matrix size 23.5 million Matrix step started

Early 2015	Experiments with 512-bit and 640-bit DLPs
	Polynomial selection for 768-bit DLP
May 2015	Sieving started for 768-bit DLP
August 2015	First matrix built (about 80 million, far too big)
November 2015	Feasible matrix (about 34 million)
December 2015	End of sieving, matrix size 23.5 million
	Matrix step started
May 2016	Matrix step completed

Computation:

- It took about 1 year wall clock time (4th May 2015 18th May 2016).
- It took about 5000 core years.
- It could be reduced to 3000-4000 core years (perhaps further).

Computation:

- It took about 1 year wall clock time (4th May 2015 18th May 2016).
- It took about 5000 core years.
- It could be reduced to 3000-4000 core years (perhaps further).

Result:

- We have (virtual) logarithms for about 23.5 million prime ideals.
- This leads to the logarithms for some of the small primes.

Precomputation (not essential, but useful):

 Extend 23.5 million logarithms to a bigger database, for example: all logarithms for prime ideals of norm < 2³⁵. (This took about 200 core years.) Precomputation (not essential, but useful):

 Extend 23.5 million logarithms to a bigger database, for example: all logarithms for prime ideals of norm < 2³⁵. (This took about 200 core years.)

For each target h compute $\log_g h$ as follows:

- Write the logarithm of target h as sum of logarithms of not too big prime ideals (e.g. < 100 bits) (average time 40 core hours, very parallel), and
- e descent prime ideals to smaller ones until all are in the database (average time 3 core hours, some parallelism).

Precomputation (not essential, but useful):

 Extend 23.5 million logarithms to a bigger database, for example: all logarithms for prime ideals of norm < 2³⁵. (This took about 200 core years.)

For each target h compute $\log_g h$ as follows:

- Write the logarithm of target h as sum of logarithms of not too big prime ideals (e.g. < 100 bits) (average time 40 core hours, very parallel), and
- e descent prime ideals to smaller ones until all are in the database (average time 3 core hours, some parallelism).

This can be improved in various ways (rebalancing, improving software).

- Comparison between factoring N and the DLP for p (p ≈ N): Although solving similarly-sized matrices is about log₂ p times more complex, solving the DLP is not log₂ p times harder than factoring.
- After having spent a few thousand core years for each "interesting" 768-bit prime, it is relatively easy to compute discrete logarithms in the corresponding prime fields.